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Translation of "The 25 Years of the Chinese Communist Party."

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**The 25 Years of the Chinese Communist Party
1921-1946**

By O. Briere

Extract from

Bulletin of Aurora University, 1946

Series III, Volume 7, No 3

(Full Translation)

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Introduction [condensed]

In a world that is divided anew, among and within the nations, the horizon is dark on all sides, particularly in China. The real crucial problem there is that of adjusting relations between the KMT and the CCP. Is such adjustment possible? We do not believe it because the CCP calls for collaboration with the government in the hope of dominating and reigning alone. An entente between them is impossible, as the first attempt at cooperation (1924) has well proved. All the good words and lavish promises cannot change that which has been evident from the beginning.

Beginnings of the CCP (1921-1928)

Modern Chinese history begins officially with the 1911 revolution, which finished the Manchu regime and brought in the Republic. But that was external and did not bring the dreamed-of transformation. The real break between ancient and new China dates from the "Movement of May 4, 1919". Such was the name given to demonstrations by Peiping students against the disappointing provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. This agitation by the student class was clothed with a special character for it interpreted China's profound aspirations. Politically it resulted in a boycott of Japanese goods. From the cultural point of view, it gave a definite impetus to the "New Culture Movement" launched by Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1) in the famous magazine "New Youth" in 1917. These two men promoted the spoken style or "Pai-hua" in place of the antique literary style which was concise to the point of obscurity. But in their view, this Literary Reform was but the first step towards completing the transformation of China; they hoped by putting reading matter within the comprehension of the people to spread the new ideas more easily.

A vague enthusiasm swept over the country following these student demonstrations; many periodicals appeared, written in colloquial style, seeking a synthesis between the old national culture and modern western civilization. Under the influence of "New Youth", which gave the tone, they spoke passionately of the slogan "science of democracy", as being the last word of modern civilization; for they wished to free themselves from Confuciasism, which they blamed for the stagnation of China.

It is not strange that in this ferment of spirit, and intense need of change, attention was directed to Soviet experience. The intellectual elite of the nation was to be found at that time in Peking. The National Peking University was truly the home of new ideas. Its professors and students expressed their thoughts through the medium of various influential magazines. Among them Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who already was very famous, suddenly gave himself to close study of the Russian October Revolution, along with his colleague Li Ta-chao.(2) These two men gathered around themselves a number of young men interested in Marxist theories and founded a magazine "The Weekly Review" to diffuse their ideas. This was the first center of interest in Marxism in China (1919).

But if Peking was then the indisputable intellectual center of China, it was not the best center for the hatching and growth of Communist ideas. Shanghai, the great industrial city, offered much greater possibilities because of her factories and her labor population. On the other hand staying in Peking had become difficult for Ch'en, who had spent several months there in prison. Also he was anxious to come to Shanghai, where he had been invited by several social-anarchist groups. Conversations were held in the former French Concession, at No 716 on the then Avenue Joffre, in the home of Tai Chi-t'ao, (3), later a member of the KMT. Their headquarters were camouflaged under the name of School of Foreign Languages. In fact a number of students were trained there who later went to the Oriental Institute in Moscow or were scattered throughout the interior for propaganda purposes. But thanks to the advice of Voitinsky, agent of the executive committee of the Comintern (4), to create a Communist party in China, the purely anarchist elements were eliminated; a Communist magazine was started whose expense was defrayed by this same Voitinsky (May 1920). Little by little various members were added whose names were to be famous in the annals of the party. The group called itself "Society of Socialist Youth".

Some time after the conversations and the purging out of members adjudged to be unorthodox from the Marxist point of view, Voitinsky proposed to organize a genuine Communist party. Ch'en Tu-hsiu agreed and gathered the most prominent members of the society to a general meeting (May 1921). The result of the discussions was the official founding of the Chinese Communist Party (June 1921). Its leaders were Ch'en Tu-hsiu for Shanghai, Li-Ta-chao for Peiping and T'an P'ing-shan (5) for Canton. A representative of the new party was dispatched to Moscow, to the congress of the Proletarians of the Far East. That was when the affiliating of the Communist party with the KMT was considered for the first time, and Moscow showed itself favorable.

RESTRICTED

-2-
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While Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the outstanding personage, was clothed with supreme dignity as the secretary-general of the party, other Communist groups were formed of Chinese students abroad; in France with Chou En-lai (6) and Li Li-san; in Germany with the future general Chu Teh; in Russia with Ch'u Ch'iu-pai. In the interior of China, active propaganda was begun among laborers and students. Also in Hunan, the Communist section of which Mao Tse-tung (7) was the secretary, founded in a few months a score of Red unions.

The following year (1922) in May, at the second general congress of the party in Shanghai, the Soviet delegate proposed officially an alliance between the two parties. /KMT and CCP/ Joffe was specially dispatched to effect this maneuver. Ch'en Tu-hsiu expressed his disapproval of this policy, which necessitated, for the time being at least, a sacrifice of certain essential aims of Communism. His intransigence came near causing a split and it took all the authority of the Third Internationale to make him allow this change of attitude.

In December of that year, while Ch'en Tu-hsiu went to help at the third congress of the Third Internationale (Comintern) Joffe had an interview with Sun Wen (Sun Yat-sen) in Shanghai, endeavoring to make him admit the principle of collaboration between the two parties. The result of the talks was the celebrated statement of 26 January, 1923 in these terms: "Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communist order or even the Soviet system cannot be actually introduced in China, because there do not exist the conditions for successfully establishing Communism or bolshevism. This opinion is fully shared by M. Joffe, who thinks that the most pressing problem for China is to achieve her national unification; also, with regard to this great task, he assures Dr. Sun of the warm sympathy and aid of Russia for the Chinese people. And Joffe solemnly promised that Russia would abstain from all Communist propaganda in China. Despite this success, his mission in other points gained nothing for the cause, and the Russian government sent Karahkan in his place. This man was more fortunate and succeeded in getting recognition of the Soviet regime. In return, Russia renounced her special rights in China. Soon after this interview, Sun Yat-sen obtained Soviet advisers for reorganizing the KMT. Very soon a flood of Russian agents under the direction of Borodin and Galen, came to spread over Canton.

Nevertheless the perplexities of Sun Yat-sen ceased not for a single day, so he continued his inquiries. In March one Liao Chung-Kai, who had followed Joffe to Japan, returned declaring to Sun Yat-sen that there was actually no Communism in Russia. The latter, much impressed, sent General Chiang Kai-shek to Moscow for more information. After a six months stay in the USSR and many discussions with Trotsky and Stalin, the future generalissimo returned with a verdict also favorable. Furthermore, the CCP met in its third national congress at Canton in June 1923, and took the historic decision to enter the KMT and co-operate with it (10 July). From that moment, the Comintern worked hard in favor of the two parties being friends. Finally, in January 1924, all these advances were officially approved by the first national KMT Congress, which voted the principle of collaboration between the two parties, leaving to the Communists their own separate committees and organs.

From then on the Communist party devoted all its efforts to gaining supremacy in the ranks of the KMT, with the support and under the direction of the Comintern. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the secretary general was then at the apogee of his glory and influence. At his direction, China was divided into three zones: Shanghai, which he administered directly, Peiping and Canton, where Li Ta-chao and T'an P'ing-shan were respectively in command. But in reality, the true masters of these two cities were the two sons of Ch'en, Yen-nien and Ch'iao-nien. Besides, various kinsmen or intimates were slipped into important posts of the party here and there, so that one could say not without reason that the Communist party had become almost the family fief of Ch'en Tu-hsiu. The growing influence of the party added in like measure to the personal prestige of its chief.

This golden age, in which there was bestowed on him the title of Chinese Lenin, passed quickly enough. In fact, his authority never was unquestioned. On the one hand, he must execute the commissions of the Soviet agents. On the other, the Communist Party never did have actual homogeneity; it consisted of three centers, divided among themselves and in disagreement on the principles themselves. Underground rivalry broke out between the Shanghai section, which he directly administered, and that of Canton which was controlled by his son Ch'en Yen-nien and the future party sentinels,

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Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, etc. The first question which divided the two groups was the land problem. The Cantonese group, advised by Borodin, sought full application of the Communist doctrine of land nationalization. Mao Tse-tung tells in his autobiography that after the Nanking Road incident of 30 May 1925, he gave himself entirely to the peasant movement. He aroused the peasants against the landlords, and the latter hounded him. Then he took refuge in Canton at the moment when Chiang Kai-shek, director of the Whampoa Military Academy, was named general of the First Army and Wang Ching-wei took the title of head of the government in place of Sun Yat-sen, who had died in Peiping on 12 March 1925. In Canton, Mao spent his energies publishing a journal which attacked the KMT right wing and in organizing the peasant movement. But he was chiefly interested in the peasantry from the Communist point of view; it was from this angle that he wrote two pamphlets in which he outlined a radical land policy and advocated a vigorous organization of peasants under the aegis of the Communist Party. Ch'en Tu-hsiu, faithful to the policy of union with the KMT, rebuffed these projects and even forbade publishing the chief organs of the party. This was the first incident which began to widen the rift between the two men. Mao Tse-tung, erstwhile a fervent admirer of Ch'en Tu-hsiu at Peiping University (1919), prepared to become his mortal enemy.

The progress of the Communists rapidly disturbed KMT circles. At the second general party congress (January 1926), in order to curb Communist intrigues it was decided to admit them only as auxiliaries, never as regular members, into the executive organs; in committees, they must never rise above the rank of members.

On the other hand, the Communist group in Canton continued to agitate and advocate a more radical policy. At a meeting held in Canton on 18 March 1926 to commemorate the anniversary of the Paris Commune, a leader of the Communist Party publicly affirmed that the hour had come to realize dictatorship of the proletariat. This was equivalent to rejecting all subordination to the KMT. But Ch'en Tu-hsiu held above all to the alliance of the two parties and did not listen to these proposals.

Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek launched his expedition against the north in order to realize the unity of China under the aegis of the KMT. The southern armies quickly conquered all south of the Yangtze and at the end of the year the Canton government moved to Wuhan, where it came under the domination of the left, favorable to the Communists. The latter, believing themselves to be on the eve of seizing power in China, multiplied their intrigues. They took much leadership in the Wuhan government, which brought reactions from Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT right; in order to check them, the generalissimo took possession of Shanghai, then of Nanking, where he established another regime loyal to himself (18 April 1927). Then he issued a proclamation condemning Communism and ordering an immediate purge of the army and administration. In Shanghai, particularly, severe restraints were put upon laborers in the Red unions.

Despite the growing tempest between the two parties, Ch'en Tu-hsiu remained firmly attached to the principle of collaboration. When Wang Ching-wei, chief of the KMT left wing, returned from Europe, Ch'en went to see him and together they signed a declaration reaffirming the principle of alliance between their two parties. "Comrades, despite the success of the national revolution, our enemies are living and always seeking to profit from our weaknesses; let us remain united; our harmony is indispensable. The CCP fully recognizes the place of the KMT and of the Three Principles in the national revolution....This is what China needs, not any dictatorship of the proletariat, but co-operation between the two parties. None of the difficulties which may arise between them, their divergences of view, are irreconcilable....At any cost collaboration must not be broken" (5 April 1927).

Annoyingly enough, this same Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who had reluctantly accepted the Comintern directives to carry out a policy of union between the two parties, showed himself now the most persistent champion of this policy. He blamed and dismissed Mao Tse-tung for having created troubles in Hunan against the KMT authorities. Also he was not surprised that the situation was very tense since the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party which was opened in May 1927; the anti-KMT atmosphere was very strong, and the advocates of rupture were very violent in presenting their point of view. But Ch'en Tu-hsiu showed himself inflexible and succeeded once more in imposing his authority, without even consulting the Central Committee. Once too often, he rejected the proposals of Mao Tse-tung for a rapid intensification of the agrarian struggle. This was his last victory, events soon became too much for him and a growing opposition prepared to overthrow him.

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On 21 May came the first military putsch by the Communists at Changsha, followed by massacres, which greatly increased the suspicions of even the left wing of the KMT and rendered the position of Borodin more precarious. What fired the powder was the notable clumsiness of an Indian Communist, Roy, Soviet delegate with the KMT forces. On June first, he invited Wang Ching-wei to a secret conference, expecting to find in him an ally, in his capacity as chief of the KMT left wing. He shared with Wang a confidential telegram from Moscow demanding the immediate use of revolutionary methods in the territory of the Wuhan government; that is to say, land confiscation, formation of a strong proletarian army of 50,000 men, creation of a revolutionary tribunal, etc. Wang Ching-wei, amazed, demanded and obtained copies of the document; on 4 June, he went to Cheng-chou in Honan, to inform the southern generals of the Soviet ultimatum and of the coup d'etat which was in preparation. On 13 June, these came back to Wuhan and after much discussion took the decision to chase the Communists out of the KMT, but kept it secret for a while longer.

Borodin seeing the error, protested vigorously to Moscow, who recalled Roy and demanded of him a reckoning. It is said that Roy disclaimed responsibility for the affair, throwing it back on another Soviet colleague. Trotsky, in one of his books, "The Disfigured Revolution" accuses Stalin of opportunism or taking the short view in having obliged the CCP to submit to the KMT rather than to follow its own essentially Marxist policy. It is his view, the logical opinion of a man who advocated permanent revolution. Or perhaps Moscow underestimated the strength of the KMT in believing themselves capable of giving orders to the left wing, of guiding it as they pleased. In any case, it did not turn out that way. On 15 July, after a month of preparation, Wang Ching-wei proposed officially and obtained the expulsion of the Communists. In consequence, Borodin and the other Soviet Advisers had to leave China.

On 1 August, because there was no longer any need for pretense, a portion of the troops of Chang Fa-k'uei, (8) under the command of two of his officers, Ho Lung (9) and Yeh T'ing, (10) revolted and seized Nan-ch'ang by surprise. For several days there was looting, arson, and a reign of terror. On the 5th, the uprising was quelled. The generals Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing, were repulsed and went their way. Ho Lung established himself on the Hunan-Hupeh border, while Yeh T'ing went to Kwangtung, where between Swaton and Canton he organized the first Red districts of Hai-feng and Lu-feng; at the end of the year he took an active part in an uprising in Canton.

While these events were transpiring, the Communist Party Central Committee held an extraordinary meeting on 7 August. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was deprived of his office as secretary general, and struggle against the KMT was decided on. Nevertheless, complete rupture did not come at once. The Comintern always counselled collaboration, if not with the government, at least with the revolutionary elements of the KMT.

In imitation of Ho Lung and of Yeh T'ing, doubtful elements of the KMT army, which had been left as rear-guard, revolted and made themselves centers of Communist action. In Kiangsi, Chu Teh rebelled, attacking and mastering in the region of Chao-mei. With a reorganized army he ravaged the north of Kwangtung. On 7 November at Hai-feng the first congress of workmen, soldiers, and soviet proletarians set up the government of Hai-feng and Lu-feng. But in the end the most important was the Canton rebellion (11 - 13 December, 1927) in which the Communists distinguished themselves by cruel massacres and lootings: on the 14th, Chang Fa-kuei recaptured the city and was guilty of reprisals no less terrible which increased the number of Communist sympathizers among the bourgeoisie. The excesses of these days caused the departure of many notable Communists, discouraged. There also resulted a complete rupture between the KMT left and the Communist Party.

Reorganization of the Party and the State of Kiangsi (1928-1934)

At the beginning of 1928, the party was in a state of complete disorganization. There was urgent need to proceed with a readaptation of Communist policy, which had failed. The Comintern in a plenary reunion held in Moscow, 9 to 25 February 1928, criticised the methods of the Chinese Communists and sent a leader Hsiang Chung-fa, who was named secretary general of the party, and Li Li-san. The disastrous experience of Canton had proved that the party could not seize political power by force; it was then decided to abandon the system of putsches and to devote all their efforts to organizing the industrial and peasant classes. This change of policy was approved by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern held also in Moscow from 18 August to 1 September 1928: "It is wholly necessary to oppose the game

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of rebellion manifested in certain sections. The executive Committee of the Comintern considers that the chief task for the party, as for the Sovietized districts is to launch the agrarian revolution and to organize bands which will be gradually transformed into a Red army". T'ang Leang-ll, "Suppressing Communist-Banditry in China", p 407.

In China, there was a re-grouping of forces within the party itself. Internal discord was rampant; there was no unanimity of views.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu, though dispossessed of power by a majority of the Central Committee, nevertheless retained much authority in party ranks. He returned to Shanghai and continued to defend his views by means of his pen. His influence among the Red unions was considerable, and they showed him much deference. After the Canton uprising, he wrote a letter to the Central Committee asking them to avoid armed conflict with the British authorities of Hong-Kong and to collaborate with the KMT left and with the Third Party, recently founded by T'ian P'ing-shan, one of the first dissidents. The Central Committee replied with a word of blame for his proposals and accused him of opportunism. Greatly displeased, Ch'en redoubled his activity in secret; he constituted for himself a small group of faithfuls with the design of overthrowing the Central Committee. His attacks against the official policy of the party continued until the Committee, worn out, expelled him with all his following, calling them "the faction of opposition".

It is the custom to give him the epithet "Trotskyite" but that is not fundamentally exact. In doctrine, he was totally opposed to Trotsky. Far from extolling the "permanent revolution", he held very mild theories. He recommended to the Central Committee the dissolution of the Red army; the cessation of strikes and various agitations, imputing the check of the Chinese revolution to the Third Internationale; he counselled returning to the study of Marxist theory, maintaining the revolutionary forces, and waiting in peace for the return of a favorable occasion. The document developing these ideas carried a hundred signatures. The Central Committee replied by the immediate expulsion of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his following, somewhat similar to the purge by Stalin with regard to the "tail" of Lenin.

After his expulsion his dominant feeling towards the Committee was hate rather than difference of opinion. He joined other expelled persons who were in fact Trotskyites. Then he began forming a Trotskyite party using financial support from the Fourth Internationale and Trotskyite students returned from Russia. In a few months he collected thousands of followers and was able to set up a new Communist government to rival that of the Central Committee. Affiliated groups rapidly sprung up everywhere. Ch'en Tu-hsiu became again "the Red emperor". Along with the organization of his party, he tried to set forth a new doctrine, whose base was his opposition to the Red army, to the Soviet government and their agrarian policy. Bitter war ensued between the two parties. The difference was chiefly one of method: Ch'en Tu-hsiu had the fault in Stalinist eyes of postponing the realization of Communism to the Greek Kalends.

The Trotskyite party had only ephemeral success. That which united them was rather a common hatred of the Stalinist faction than any profound faith for definite action. When the intimates of Ch'en Tu-hsiu perceived that this ideology led nowhere, defection quickly spread among their ranks; some of the disillusioned rejoined the Nanking government, others the rival faction. Finally Ch'en Tu-hsiu was turned over to the police by one of his family (15 November 1932) and imprisoned. Pardoned during the Sino-Japanese war (13 August 1937) he was taken back into the KMT, but died soon after (24 May 1942).

The disturbance provoked in Stalinist circles by the activities of Ch'en Tu-hsiu lasted for some time; nevertheless his "opportunist" policy, his gentle Communism, could not withstand the dangers to the Communist party as well as the policy followed by Li Li-san. (11)

Li Li-san was a student returned from France, where he had aided in forming a section of the Communist party among his fellow countrymen. He was, even in the judgment of Mao Tse-tung, one of the most brilliant personalities of the party and one of the nearest to Trotsky that China had produced, certainly much more than Ch'en Tu-hsiu. From the beginning he divided his time between Shanghai and Hankow where the Communist Party had big "underground" quarters. He dominated the party from 1929 to 1933, and therefore was the second person to have great influence in it.

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Impressed by the success of Communist arms in various districts of Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi, Li Li-san adopted a policy opposite to that of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, scorning also the directives of the Comintern and the agrarian policy extolled by Mao Tse-tung. Exaggerating the maturity of the revolutionary situation in China, he adopted a policy of extreme violence. Believing the moment propitious for overthrowing the Nanjing government, for Chiang was engaged with the northern general Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang, he tried to combine a general offensive of the Red armies with popular uprisings stirred up in the big centers. He wanted to create terror in the villages in order to demoralize the bourgeoisie. This extreme revolutionary tactic frightened the Comintern, who had just expressed their opposition to putsches, and caused panic among the other members of the CCP, who excommunicated him. Far from submitting, Li Li-san created a dissident Central Committee in Hupeh. Sustained in secret by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pei, secretary-general of the party, he continued his struggle against the Central Committee; his followers rapidly increased. Moscow, having studied reports upon reports, ordered an immediate end to the "line of Li Li-san", and summoned him to Russia to account for his deeds. His lack of success or rather his fleeting success before Chang-sha (28 July 1930) put him in a bad military situation, and besides he had to obey orders from Moscow.

After his departure, the party was entirely disorganized, for the rebellions he had provoked were easily suppressed. In the winter of that same year (1930), the Central Committee was able to subdue the followers of Li Li-san, and began to purge the administrations where they were in control; 25 percent of the total were excluded. Then the orthodox members of the Committee reunited in the congress of 15 January 1931 and severely condemned the policy of Li Li-san.

Li Li-san disappeared, but "Lilisanism" was not entirely crushed with him. In the army it caused a very serious incident which imperilled the entire Red army. At Fu-t'ien in Hunan, a group of Red troops under Liu Li-tsao, wished to follow the line of Li Li-san, revolted, arrested the President of the Kiangsi Soviets, and disarmed a part of the troops. This caused no little excitement in Fu-t'ien, which was close to Chi-an, at the very center of the Soviet districts. "Indeed," says Mao Tse-tung, "it seemed that the fate of the revolution depended on the issue of this struggle". After the first moment of dismay in the Red camp, they set themselves to suppress this danger. Quickly Liu Li-tsao was arrested, his soldiers disarmed and "liquidated"! Such was the end of "Lilisanism" but the alarm had been hot and the party nearly collapsed as a result of its own internal quarrels.

Despite these domestic difficulties, the most serious yet experienced by the party, the various small bands of Red soldiers took advantage of the conflicts between Chiang Kai-shek and the northern generals, to develop themselves in the provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan, Hupeh and Anhwei. Soviets were established in the occupied districts, where they began, from the end of 1928, to practice the reforms prescribed by the Comintern; confiscation of large land-holdings and redistribution of the seized lands among poor peasants and the families of soldiers. Thus resulted the setting up of many strongly Communist places, from which came forth Red troops. Among these bases, a principal one was Ch'a-ling on the Hunan border where a Soviet was established in November 1927. A solid base was set up in Ching-kan-shan (on the Hunan-Kiangsi border) and a moderate policy adopted as against certain violent elements who advocated pillage and massacre. The following year, in May, Chu Teh arrived with his troops and joined them with those of Mao Tse-tung. In the autumn there was a meeting of delegates from Sovietized "hsien" of this area. A minority showed some attachment to a more radical and violent policy, but the majority rallied around Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, (12) that is, to the policy of land division and the establishment of Soviets. Finally the Central Committee ratified the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, in accord with the Sixth Communist Congress of Moscow. Harmony was restored between the leaders of the party and of the Sovietized districts.

Among other centers of Communist activity, we mention a district in the west of Hupeh occupied by Ho Lung and another in the east established by Hsi Hsi-tung (13) nucleus of the future Soviet of O-yü-wan, where two notable Reds, Hsi Hsiang-ch'ien (14) and Chang Kuo-t'ao (15) were brought together.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

-7-
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Another zone was Sovietized in the northeast of Kiangsi, which became a powerful base (winter of 1927). In the spring of 1928, a movement began around Chi-an, which was destined to become the center of the Soviet government. In the west of Fukien, another region was organized, where the Ninth congress of the party was held; there the way was prepared for the future state of Kiangsi (December 1929). The following year the entire south of this province fell into the hands of the Red army. On the seventh of February, 1930, an important local conference reunited delegates of the party, the army and the government. The land problem was discussed at length and in its broad outlines, and the decision was taken, against "opportunists" such as Ch'en Tu-hsiu, to proceed with land re-distribution and to set up the Soviet Government of Kiangsi. In fact more than a year had to elapse before the definitive organization of a regular government. On 8 November 1931, at Jui-chin, capital of the new state, the first all-China Soviet Congress was held, at which Mao Tse-tung was elected President of the Red districts of Kiangsi, and Chu Teh was chosen as commander-in-chief.

From then on, the authority of Mao Tse-tung was to dominate the party and never again to be seriously questioned. If one wishes by comparisons to place the three most influential chiefs who have directed the CCP, it is necessary to say that Ch'en Tu-hsiu was the Chinese Lenin, as has been done several times; but the comparison is only external, for if Ch'en Tu-hsiu was the creator of the party, he had neither the genius nor the audacity of Lenin; expelled from the party by another faction, his memory is forever held in execration by Chinese Communists. The likeness between Li Li-san and Trotsky is much more striking, and their destinies were similar. As to Mao Tse-tung, one can bestow on him the title of Stalin without forcing the phrase. Of the three Chinese leaders, he shows more boldness than Ch'en Tu-hsiu and more flair for politics than Li Li-san; he understands better how to adapt Communism to conditions in China. While his predecessors relied most of all upon the urban proletariat, he on the other hand, with a tenacity which overcame all opposition, put the emphasis on agrarian policy.

We stop awhile on the State of Kiangsi to examine the work of organization. The strategy of the Russian Communist Party, which rose to power thanks chiefly to the support of the peasant class to which it had promised all the land, has been strictly followed by the CCP. These demagogic tactics have chiefly borne fruit in the provinces which have suffered most from civil war and where extreme poverty was most widespread amongst the masses.

When the Red troops take possession of a district, their first act is the calling of a general assembly of delegates of the people to elect a government. But the active candidates have been previously chosen by the Communist chiefs from among their sympathizers, and once elected, they stay under the vigilant control of sections or cells of the party. This holds for all levels of the administration.

The administration established, the first legislative act of the Soviets is to issue a decree ordering the destruction of all the documents, titles, contracts relating to land ownership; confiscation of the lands of "landlords" and of comfortable peasants, their redistribution into the hands of the poor population; and the abolition of taxes collected by the former authorities. The distribution of land is effected in proportion to the members of each family. Besides, the party drives for the organization of peasants unions composed of poor and moderately well-off peasants, who serve as a means of penetration to the heart of the rural population. The more radical of these peasant unions are organized into "Committees of the Indigent", charged to protect the interests of the rural proletariat. Finally these committees are in turn controlled by Communist cells established at their heart. In brief, the administrative machinery and control is the most solid. The grip of the party is absolute.

Looking at the situation particularly of Chinese Communism, the party only leans on the working masses with hesitation, because hitherto the Sovietized towns have been in places of little importance, where large industrial enterprises are not found. From the viewpoint of orthodox Communism the artisans, who constitute the working proletariat, do not offer the same assurance of support as do the urban proletariat of the industrial centers. Also the party does not depend on itself alone. Nevertheless the role of labor unions is no less important in the Red districts than in the KMT industrial centers. These occupational unions serve well the cause of the party and enable it to meet in important gatherings for study of the workers' movement and the policy to follow.

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All the large industrial and commercial enterprises are nationalized, as well as the banks and credit concerns. Retail shops and artisans are not molested at first, but in course of time they are the object of all sorts of persecution; they are crushed under the weight of taxes and that which remains of individual trade passes into the hands of peddlers, made similar to the proletariat.

In the matter of "social deeds", the party transforms hospitals into free dispensaries, if that is possible; besides, it starts consumer cooperatives, amusement places, popular theatres. All buildings for worship, pagodas, temples, churches, are transformed into workers' clubs or other establishments for public use.

It is quite natural to understand that one of the greatest preoccupations of the party is the education of youth. All schools become "proletarian schools" where the instruction is Leninist, atheistic above all. Moreover the youth are regimented into unions of all sorts, "League of Communist Youth", "Vanguard", for the young of 16 years and above, "Pioneers" for children from 8 to 16. These organizations play a great part, as much for the formation of elite Communists as for missions of control or propaganda which are entrusted to them.

Finally, to have necessary reserves on hand, the party has introduced a system of militarization of the population, according to which all the urban and rural proletariat, women included, must receive military instruction.

To complete the outline of the Soviet organization of Kiangsi some figures will give us accuracy and instructive comparisons. At the second general congress of Soviet China, which also was held at Jui-chin, from 22 January to 1 February 1934, Mao Tse-tung presented a general picture of Communist activities in Kiangsi in which he gave some statistics, valuable for showing us the importance of the work accomplished. Red unions in the central region of Kiangsi and nearby Sovietized districts totalled 229,000 members; from 6,988 landlords, 317,539 Mou of land had been confiscated. Farm products had increased 15 per cent in a year, agricultural offices and schools were started here and there. Industry was only begun in 1933, with the setting up or restoration of paper-mills, textile mills and sugar-works; to make up for deficiency of salt, for the KMT forces maintained a strict and effective blockade, they made synthetic salt. From the educational point of view, 3052 primary Leninist schools and 6,462 night courses were being carried on in 21,932 villages of Kiangsi, Fukien and Kwangtung, with a total of 183,617 pupils. Higher education included the Red Army University, Soviet University, Marxist and Communist University and many other technical institutions.

These developments were helped by the struggles which Chiang Kai-shek had to carry on against the northern generals. But when these had submitted the Nanking government returned to the last faction that threatened national unity, that is, the Communists. After several months of preparation a general offensive was launched against them at the end of 1930, on both the political and the military fronts. At the first, the means of communication between the Comintern and the Far East was destroyed; Hsiang Chung-fa, secretary general of the party was arrested along with thousands of others and shot, the chief vital organs for party guidance were broken up; the last blow was specially painful to the Communists, and the debris of the Central Committee hastened to leave Shanghai. They were replaced by a commission of young members, little known, but energetic.

Under the push of these young men, there soon appeared signs of renewed activity of the Communist Party. The volume of propaganda noticeably increased; thus the number of publications circulating in Shanghai in September 1931, was 66, while a month previous there were almost none.

From the military point of view, operations commenced after a conference held in Nanking from 12 to 18 November 1930. In December, the KMT army penetrated the Red territory of Kiangsi by five different routes, with plenty of distrust. In a month by a series of manoeuvres which consisted in withdrawing, scattering before superior forces in order to fall upon isolated groups, the Communist army put their adversaries to rout. In February 1931 there was a second expedition under the general Ho Ying-ch'in; the regular troops advanced across the mountains, were intercepted and decimated according to the former tactics and had to beat a retreat. Immediately Chiang Kai-shek himself launched a third offensive in the following June, which opened with brilliant success; the important centers of Tung-ku and Shih-ch'eng were encircled and taken by assault; after several weeks of respite to clear up and clean up the region occupied, the campaign was vigorously resumed in September, when the Japanese suddenly invaded Manchuria and took Mukden (18 September 1931).

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To face this new situation, the Nanking government had to levy troops and in October desisted from its struggle against the Reds. The Manchurian conflict was followed by the first Shanghai war (January 1932). So for a long period the Nanking armies were obliged to maintain a defensive attitude. The Communists took advantage of this to attack and retake a large part of the lost territory. When an armistice was signed with the Japanese (May 1932), the government planned a new offensive against the Soviet areas of Hupeh, Hunan and Anhwei. In the towns they hunted vigorously and found many secret bureaus of the Communist Party; there were many arrests and a good number of defections appeared in the Red ranks following an unpopular nomination; Hsiang Chung-fa was replaced as secretary general by Ch'ien Shao-yu, alias Wang Ming (16) a young man of 25 recently graduated from the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. This choice displeased the senior members of the party and provoked a schism. In order not to make matters worse, the Comintern had to name him to another post. In revenge, to avoid new defections and to strengthen those who were wavering, the party undertook a campaign of terror against the deserters.

As military events, there were no major operations during the course of 1932. The Communists advanced to the gates of Hankou, Amoy, and even of Nanking. On each side, there were alternations of success and failure. To be definite, the Nationalists attacked Communist points in Anhwei and Hupeh and wiped out the fortified nest which Ho Lung had built for himself in the middle of Lake Hung on the north bank of the Yangtze. A fifth campaign was launched in April 1933 and began successfully but ended in disaster. In October 1933 an expedition was undertaken on a grand scale. On the advice of German officers, his "advisers", Chiang Kai-shek began a new strategy which bore fruit in erecting a series of block houses, in general on high ground, at a distance sufficient for mutual defense, all around the Sovietized territory. Satisfying progress had been made when the 19th Army, which had fought so bravely against the Japanese at Shanghai in 1932, revolted with its chief Ts'ai T'ing-shih (17) against the government, and tried to set up a republic in Fukien. It took several months for the central troops to quell this rebellion. In January, 1934, the affair was liquidated. During the months following, operations were resumed actively against the Reds, in what may be considered a sixth offensive. This time there was greater determination than ever to finish them once for all, and preparations were also on a larger scale. Chang Hsueh-liang repulsed a Communist army which tried to capture Kiukiang; in May, the Reds were driven from Fukien; in August, from Anhwei; they returned to Fochow in August, but were driven out again. Finally the cordon was tightened around the Soviet territory. Despite their manoeuvring skill, their rapidity of movement, their fighting spirit, they were not equal to resisting the very superior government forces. On 16 October 1934, their general exodus began.

The causes which obliged the Communists to leave their base in Kiangsi were not solely military. From the economic point of view, the Red republic had not been a success; the agrarian policy which had been carried out in a very rigorous fashion had detracted from, it seemed, the prosperity of the new state; most of all, in the view of Mao Tse-tung, the blockade strictly enforced by the central armies would have serious consequences; food supplies most necessary, such as salt, were lacking. While the bulk of the Red army succeeded in breaking through the cordon, a certain number of detachments remained as rear-guard in Kiangsi. Jui-chin, the capital, was only captured on 11 November. Ch'iu Ch'iu-pei, former secretary general was seized and shot. In fact, the earliest Communist elements to undertake this famous "Long March" were the troops of Hsiao K'o (18) in August 1934; breaking the first line of encirclement, they came into the south of Hunan, crossed Kwangsi and Kweichow, and arrived on the banks of the Wu Chiang a stream which flows north of Kwei-yang the capital of Kweichow; but a nationalist army was awaiting them and they had to retrace their steps; after this they stayed within the three provinces, Szechwan, Kweichow, Hunan. Ho Lung's army reached that vicinity. Together they ordered Hsi Hsiang-ch'ien, who had carved for himself a new Red domain in Szechwan, to open up a way of communication with Shensi and Kansu.

Under the direction of its high chieftains, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Lin Piao (19) and others, the bulk of the Red army gathered near Yü-tu in southern Kiangsi. The marching orders were given on 16 October 1934. On the 21st, in extreme secrecy, the Reds attacked and pierced the first line of defense bordering on Kwangtung and Hunan; on 3 November, they broke down the second, a week later the third, and on the 29th the fourth and last. Carefully avoiding all important opposing groups, they entered Kweichow in two columns which reunited under the walls of Kwei-yang, with the intention of rejoining the advance guard of Hsiao K'o, in the frontier zone of Szechwan-Hunan. While Chiang Kai-shek took measures to bar them from the Yangtze route and access to Szechwan, wishing at all costs to keep them south of the river, suddenly they veered towards the south, crossing the Wu River (in the north of Kweichow) on 4 January 1935; but the provincial troops of Liu Hsiang military governor of Szechwan, were on watch and forced them to turn back towards the south; they crossed the Pei-p'ing River on 17 April, entered Yunnan the following month, passed near the capital and finally arrived in sight of the Yangtze which flowed deeply shut in through this region of high mountains. There, thanks to the darkness and secrecy, they crossed the river by surprise, disarmed the stunned garrison, and undertook to help the other troops to cross; six large boats labored for nine days to get the Red army across.

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- 10 -
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The central authorities were then obliged to go to bar their way across the Ta-tu Ho (River), which flows parallel to the Yangtze on the north. After traversing a barren region, the Red army arrived at An-shun-ch'ang and tried to cross the Ta-tu Ho (26 May); one column succeeded at great cost; seeing which the generals decided to go 400 li in order to cross the Ta-tu at the westernmost bridge, at Lu-ting-ch'iao. The Red army arrived there on 30 May and crossed it with heavy losses. In all the journey to Shensi, this was the most critical period, even in the view of Communists.

North of the Ta-tu Ho, it was necessary to climb high snowy mountains, to come down to broad plains, for it was June. Here too the losses were heavy. When the two met at Tzu-pa, they thrust into west Szechwan, arriving on 16 June at Hou-lung, and made junction, near Sung-p'ien, with the army of Hsi Hsiang-ch'ien and Chang Kuo-t'ao, who had Sovietized this region some months before. The pursuing army being far away, they rested here a week; then being thus refreshed, the Reds resumed their march northward.

Arriving on 10 July at Mac-erh-kai, the two army groups which had just merged held a meeting to determine the course to follow. They could not agree. Hsi Hsiang-ch'ien and Chang Kuo-t'ao, already established in Szechwan, felt it preferable to remain in the domain which they had carved out, and consolidate it rather than to go on into Shensi, a country so destitute of resources. The Central Committee, with Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, held a contrary view, in favor of the north in the hope of Russian aid. Finally, in August 1935, the Kiangsi forces turned northwards, leaving Chu Teh commander of the southern troops with Hsi Hsiang-ch'ien and Chang Kuo-t'ao. On 23 August, supplied with grain and meat, the Red army found itself in steppe lands, inhabited by hostile nomad tribes, Man-tzu and Hsi-fan, who inflicted serious losses on the invaders. After crossing the grass-lands, they were joined at Pao-tso by the southern group, who had yielded to the majority view. There the differences broke out anew and still more sharply. Playing up the soldiers' fear of a 21-day march across the steppes from Pai-lung-Chiang to Kan-su, Chang Kuo-t'ao refused to follow the bulk of the army and returned with Hsi Hsiang-ch'ien to Mac-erh-kai. Thence he led his troops to Sikang, but difference of language and customs cut off all facilities for development. He thought of passing over into Sinkiang (Turkestan) to get into contact with the USSR, but the Russians showed no confidence in him. In despair he wound up by obeying Mao Tse-tung and came into Shensi. Molested on his arrival, he continued to criticize and was imprisoned. On 17 April 1938, he escaped and rejoined his old friend Ch'en Tu-hsiu in Wuhan. Naturally there was an explosion of anger and curses on him and his memory is as much execrated as that of the late Ch'en Tu-hsiu.

The Shensi Base and the Anti-Japanese War. (1935-1946)

On 20 October 1935, a year after leaving Kiangsi the vanguard of the Red army made junction with the troops of a small Sovietized zone in the north of Shensi, under the control of Liu Tzu-tan (20) and Hsi Hsi-tung. Proud of this long march of 25,000 li (strictly speaking not more than 18,038) Marxist writers gladly make comparison with Napoleon and Hannibal. They pretend to have marched 235 days and 18 nights; of the 100 days of resting, 56 were spent in the north of Szechwan. The average daily march was 70 li. But the crossing of high mountain-ranges, of mighty rivers lined with enemies, countless long combats, and fatigue, had decimated the army; of 100,000 men who left Kiangsi only 20,000 reached Shensi, or one man in five.

In Shensi a totally different policy was followed, as much because of the experiences in Shensi as because of new conditions. The chief point of the new program was the famous slogan "United Anti-Japanese Front". Communists fish in troubled waters; their growth in China has coincided with the Nanking government's wars; in 1928, against the northern generals, in 1931-32 against the Japanese in Manchuria and Shanghai, in 1933, the revolt of Ts'ai T'ing-ch'ieh and of the 19th army. It was then to their advantage to wish for a new total war against Japan, which would permit them not only to reorganize their forces, but also to develop their potential to the highest point. On their arrival in Shensi, they were exhausted, also it was necessary at all costs to divert the attention of the central government. On the other hand, was there any better means of capturing popular sympathy than by calling for war against Japan and preparing the best patriots? Naturally we would not go so far as to deny all patriotic sentiment in their calculations, but it is undeniable that their interests accorded admirably with their patriotic pretensions.

In harmony with this new word of the general command, they softened considerably their methods of Sovietization. Land-confiscation was almost abandoned.

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It is true that north Shensi being **RESTRICTED** did not lend itself to this policy, for large landholders were rare. They did not touch various groups who were recently molested; they took nothing save from very rich owners. Even private trade and industry had liberties unknown a short while before in Kiangsi; even chambers of commerce received permission to exist. Workers -- the class "dear" above all others -- could not get too much mixed up in the control of production. In the administration, they allowed the urban bourgeoisie to share in the government alongside of peasants, workers, soldiers. Finally, foreign policy was also revised; they did not molest foreigners indiscriminately, and they agreed to collaborate with anti-imperialist nations on certain conditions. Such is a resumé of the program of action published by Wang Ming in "International Correspondence" under date of 15 February 1936. The author gives to his article a significant title "For a turning in all the domains of our work"; and he says: "It is necessary to make a determined end of our regrettable faults and our factional 'left' traditions, in both policy and in work on the masses throughout the KMT provinces. But in turning, it is equally necessary in the matter of policy that we remain in the Soviet regions, particularly in the sense that it is necessary to confer on it a more pronounced popular and national character"..

In August 1935, they began to propose cessation of civil war and the union of all parties in a struggle against the Japanese aggressor, under the aegis of a democratic government, which would ally itself with the USSR and other countries friendly to China. Skill in this new policy won much sympathy, and events were responsible for showing opportunism. On 9 December 1935, Peking students, "led by our party" says Mao Tse-tung, demonstrated in favor of national liberation. The Japanese intrigued more and more in the northern provinces; witness the seizure of Jehol (1933), the autonomy of Hopei-Chaha under a Japanese protectorate (1935), the invasion of Suiyuan (1936). These events greatly increased the national feeling against the Japanese, who each year since the invasion of Manchuria (1931) had nibbled off a bit of China. The Communists skillfully profited by making themselves the champions of patriotism and accusing Nanking of being deficient in boldness. At the beginning of 1936, they attacked the neighboring province of Shansi but were quickly repulsed and forced to recross the Yellow River. On the other hand, in the south, the generals Li Tsung-jen (21) and Pai Chung-hsi (22) chieftains of Kwangsi, and Ch'en Chi-t'ang (23) military governor of Kwangtung, attempted a separatist movement in the southwest calling it the "National Army of Salvation" against Japan. Happily, the crisis was quickly passed and the rebel generals submitted (June-July 1936).

But if the rebellion had been crushed so easily, it was perhaps not without influence on a crisis which arose in northwest China at the end of the same year. To oversee the new Red zone of Shensi, Chiang Kai-shek had designated Chang Hsueh-liang (24) and his northeast army as well as Yang Hsueh'eng and the 17th army. Displeased over these appointments, officers and men easily let themselves be persuaded by Communist propaganda to desert from the civil war. Seeing their wilful inertia, Chiang Kai-shek went in person to rebuke them. On 12 December 1936 he was made prisoner by Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hsueh'eng. Such was the famous "Sian Incident", which plunged the people into stupefaction. But popular reaction was quite different from what was hoped for by the captors. On this occasion one could put his finger on the profound respect and affection felt by the Chinese people for their chief. Before the attitude of the people and of the government, the rebellious generals were compelled to release the "generalissimo" on the evening of 25 December. When the news became known throughout the country, the enthusiasm was as delirious as consternation had been keen since the capture. The authors of the coup d'état were made prisoners or deprived of power and their troops transferred to the south. A loyal army came to replace them and to begin the blockade of the Sovietized zone.

The non-aggression agreement concluded between the Communists and the "northwest" army was not however effective for long. Frustrated in their hopes, the Reds intensified their propaganda for union of all parties against Japan and the cessation of civil war. The Comintern, in the course of the Seventh Congress of the Third Internationale, approved this reversal of attitude, for the international situation was becoming more and more menacing, following the Anti-Comintern Pact of 25 November 1936, between Germany, Italy and Japan; it was necessary to cease civil war in China in order to oppose her against Japan, and therefore to ask the Chinese Soviets to find a ground of agreement with the national government by sacrificing for a time certain essential points of the Marxist program.

On 10 February 1937, the Central Committee of the Communist Party sent a letter to the Nanking government and to the Third Plenary Assembly of the KMT, proposing a cessation of the civil war, freedom of speech, press, and assembly, release of political prisoners, setting up of a plan of resistance to Japanese aggression and return to the "Three People's Principles" of Sun Yat-sen. In return, they promised to change the name of the Red army and that of Soviet government, to realize a democratic form of government in the Red areas, to suspend the policy of land confiscation and to concentrate all their efforts on the task of resisting the aggressor.

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But the KMT Congress, which met from 15 to 22 February, took no notice of the telegram. After rejecting the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek and passing a motion to retake the lost territory in Chahar and Hopei the members of the congress closed their sessions issuing a long manifesto demanding the abolition of the Red army and the Soviet republic, cessation of Communist propaganda and abandonment of class war. The negotiations for an armistice seem to amount to nothing. Nevertheless they began again from the Red side on 15 March. On his part Chiang Kai-shek had stopped the civil war, promised amnesty and large liberty of the press and it was clear that he was actively preparing for war with Japan which was all too near.

Curiously enough at the time of these dealings, the prime minister of Japan made a friendly gesture towards China by inviting her to renew cultural and economic ties between the two countries. What consternation in the Red camp if the impossible rapprochement had taken place! But this manoeuvre was perhaps only an artifice to cause delay and to quiet suspicions. However that be, Japan's traditional policy soon resumed its true form in the presenting of new demands on Nanking. The result of these intrigues was, as all knew, the Lu-kou-ch'iao (Marco Polo Bridge) incident (7 July 1937) and that of Shanghai (13 August) with which hostilities commenced between China and Japan.

The first act of the Reds was to issue a manifesto, in which they promised to put into effect what they had already several times proposed, namely the ending of their former policy of class warfare, land-confiscation, Soviet government, and independent Red army.

After the publication of this document, the names of the Red army and government were changed; from now on the Shensi base carried the designation "Special (MI- should be Border) District of Shensi, Kansu, and Ningxia". The army which had made the "Long March" was regrouped and re-named "Eighth Route Army". The remainder of Red forces scattered over the country and which had played the role of guerrillas were reorganized and christened "New Fourth Army". Chu Teh was made commander of the former with P'eng Te-huai (25) as deputy; Wei Ting was raised to be head of the New Fourth with Hsiang Ying as his second-in-command. Since the beginning of the war, the Eighth Route Army claimed the privilege of merely making simple war as guerrillas and not taking part in large-scale battles. Naturally Nanking agreed, for a veto would have meant nothing. The guerrilla warfare which these two armies carried on in north China against the Japanese was moreover, suited to their principles of military strategy. In their infantry manual, entitled "Guerrilla Warfare", one finds this principle: "Never a defeat!" To realize that, they never engage in large-scale combat; moreover they do not have the equipment needed for large operations; also they are specialists in ambushes and surprise blows. Their skill in manoeuvres comes in large part from their extreme mobility; during the Long March the national army could not overtake them; they were able to accomplish on foot astonishing distances in record time. The effort also demanded soldiers toughened and inured to hardships; but how much they paid in life for the rigors of the journey!

We are right in asking at what results the "pa-lu" (26) arrived against the Japanese. If we can believe Mao Tse-tung, in 1943 there were 64 per cent of the Japanese forces in territory controlled by the Reds as against 36 per cent in the KMT zone; in 1944, the proportion was slightly different; 56 per cent in "pa-lu" country and 44 per cent on the southern front. Let us admit for a moment that these figures are exact. Do they necessarily prove what their author intended them to suggest? Did the Japanese really fear the Reds more? We do not think so. Never, at any moment of the war, did the Communists release against the Japanese a long battle line, necessitating on the enemy's part a grand deploying of forces; the entire effort of the war, all the offensive and defensive operations undertaken on a large scale, were supported by the KMT armies. It would then be quite astonishing if the Japanese had feared the Communists most of all. The true reason for these figures -- if they are real, we repeat -- is quite different, in our opinion. The Japanese lived on north China in an economic and industrial way, they supervised all the work in order to hasten its results in their country, while they hoped to detach to their advantage a large part of the north; for all this they needed numerous garrisons, useless in the south, which at least concerned them less. We do not wish to say that on occasion such an isolated Communist group, admitted to fight by the side of the KMT, would not act bravely; but that was the fact with only a few token detachments.

The Communist troops reserved themselves for a crusade higher in their eyes than defence of the national territory. Convinced that the aggressor would some day be obliged to return home defeated, the Reds prepared most of all for the post-war time. It is amusing enough to read the following accusation which Mao Tse-tung expressed about his KMT adversaries: "Politically and economically they regard the Communists as their enemy 'No. 1' and the Japanese aggressors as enemy 'No. 2'; so they are actively preparing for another war to exterminate the Communists". If we return this slanderous reproach on the accuser, we think no one will be tempted to contradict us; and even if there be truth in the Communist accusation, what does that prove? Merely that the two foes foresee the future and are preparing for the actual civil war which is inevitable. Moreover the Reds certainly exploited the situation admirably by increasing their effectives from several dozen to several hundred thousands at least. Edgar Snow himself, though very sympathetic towards the Reds, admits in "People on Snow" that the Communist troops obtained few results because they were poorly armed. RESTRICTED

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From the political point of view, they were going to develop a new ideology, whose basis is the acceptance of a revolutionary three principles of the people, such as one finds in some of the first works of Sun Yat-sen. They were then going to dispute with the KMT the inheritance of the three principles. According to a small tract circulated in the 1943 campaign, here are the chief lines in this new body of doctrines.

China must pass through several stages before arriving at the goal of a socialist earthly paradise. In effect, one can arrange in two groups all the aspects of revolution; one is the democratic revolution, the other is the socialist revolution. China is not yet ripe for the socialist era, she must first pass through the democratic stage. This democratic revolution, however, is no longer the French revolution of 1789, that of the 17th century in England, of 1911 in China, which were born at a time when capitalism was in full growth; in China a neo-democratic revolution is necessary, similar to the Russian revolution of February 1905 brought about in the period of imperialism; that is to say, in good Marxist doctrine, in the period of decadent capitalism. The one is capitalist democracy, the other is socialist democracy, the stage of transition. The Chinese revolution is of course not an affair of any particular country, it is a link in an immense chain of world revolution which began with the Russian revolution of October 1917. "Assuredly socialism is a stage far superior to the new democracy; we will realize it some day, but actual conditions do not permit us to do more than dream of it". (27) Why? Because in China there still exist many survivals of the obscurantist past, which hinder social progress; besides China no longer has full political independence to allow her elbow room.

The neo-democratic revolution has for its mission to bring the theories of Sun Yat-sen to full bloom, for the triple revolution, national, political and social, advocated by the "Father of the Nation" has not yet been achieved.

At first what will be the essence of the new State? Modified capitalism or socialism? Neither one nor the other. "The neo-democratic republic has neither a capitalist administration nor a proletarian government; it is a democracy directed by all the revolutionary classes operating together". In these terms the dictatorship of the proletariat is abandoned. The verbal concession is a limited one. Before the skepticism which this statement could cause, Mao Tse-tung felt obliged to give reassuring words last year, at the seventh national party congress. "Some ask if the Communists, once in power, will establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and a one-party government as in the USSR. We can say to such persons that a neo-democratic state constituted by the union of all democratic classes is different in principle from a socialist state with dictatorship of the proletariat. China, during the period of her neo-democratic system, cannot have, and ought not to have, a government monopolized by one party. We have no reason for not co-operating with non-Communist parties who agree to work with us and are not hostile to us" (28)

The practical form which this new democracy will adopt will be a tripartite government, one-third composed of members of the Communist party, one-third of progressive representatives of the capitalist class, and finally a last third of delegates of the middle class. Often this generous disinterestedness of the party does not prevent them from having a high hand for effective direction. Are not its members the leaven which gives life to the whole lump? So they will be fully justified in being of first rank in the new city. To assume their role of leadership, they will have recourse neither to violence nor to dependence on fixed laws like the KMT, but will rely on the confidence and protection of the multitude.

If the form of the new government is mid-way between capitalism and socialism, the same is true of the economy of the new state. In this field, the grand concession of the party is the recognition de facto of the right of ownership and the cessation of land-confiscation, a condition since gun non imposed by the KMT for collaboration between the two parties. As the rural class comprises the enormous majority of the nation, say 80 per cent, it is the principal force on which the new regime rests. Moreover in its solicitude for the peasants, the neo-democratic state proclaims very high equality in rights to the soil. Yet the amelioration of peasant conditions must be obtained without injuring the landowners' rights; it is sufficient to limit land-rent and interest, that is to say, the profits of the landlords, while leaving to them their lands. In 1945, Mao Tse-tung re-affirmed the same doctrine in the report already cited; "Since the outbreak of hostilities, the Communist Party has made a great concession in replacing the policy of "Land to the tiller by that of reduction of rent and interest -- To unite all classes in the anti-Japanese Common Front, we must not deprive the landlord of his right to property, but merely persuade him to accept reasonable rent and interest, and encourage him to invest his capital in industrial enterprises -- Rich farmers are encouraged to increase their production". (29)

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If private capital is treated the same as it is not the same with the financing of large enterprises; banks, factories, large-scale, air and rail traffic, will be operated by the State. The reason offered is that monopoly by private capital over national resources cannot be tolerated in time of war. It is capitalism controlled by the State. The remainder is sufficient for private industry.

One may ask what remains of Communist principles after the abandonment of an equality program. The taboo seems to have been so radical as to upset certain faithful ones of the party and to have made them fear even the ruin of Communism in China; according to them, the adoption of a policy remote from the party's essential principles will necessarily bring on its decline. To which the official or ans reply that they are not executing a retreat, a concession of principle, but a change of method imposed by circumstances. To an American journalist, Haldore Hanson, Mao Tse-tung replied one day: "The Communist Party has not ceased to be Communist. Our final goal is unchanged. But the forces of revolution have recently been modified and we ought to change our program in harmony with this evolution. For ten years, the principal enemy of the Chinese masses has been the landlord and the usurer, or, in other words, the feudal forces. It was then necessary to divide private property and kill landlords in order to weaken the forces of reaction. But gradually the danger of Japanese invasion has overshadowed the evils of Chinese feudalism. You have been able to see with your own eyes that the terror inspired by the hostile army exceeded by far the oppression of feudal lords. Our immediate objective is to free China from her semi-colonial status. This is the actual phase of the Chinese Revolution. The revolutionary forces included peasants above all, but also landlords and capitalists. That is what we call the National United Front". (20)

Such are the words of the political chiefs, the ideas expressed in journals and reviews. Did real conditions correspond to those statements? It seems that it is often necessary to say yes, for reasons entirely different from the motives alleged; but this was far from being absolute, and varied greatly with different sections.

Collaboration between the KMT and the Communist Party during the war with Japan was marked by several clashes. The Communist press organs in Chungking were under close surveillance; at one time the famous "Shonghuo" (Life) bookstore, the great center of "leftist" publications, was temporarily closed along with its numerous branches; concentration camps were filled with dissidents. One of the most important events was the attack in 1940, south of the Yangtze in the region of Shanghai, of a "New Fourth" detachment by a group of government soldiers; the chief officer, Yeh T'ing, was captured, his deputy Hsiang Ying and several of the staff were killed and replaced in turn by Chen Yi; this man took general command of the army in place of Yeh T'ing, who crashed in an airplane carrying him from Chungking to Yenan (May or June 1946)

Now the war is over. Are the theories of "neo-democracy" still current? It is certain that the press campaign is on the whole much lessened. Is their propaganda role then finished? Yes, so it would seem; was not that a wartime ideology thought up to camouflage the real ends of the party behind a visible facade of patriotism and to give to Marxian quasi-bourgeois, benign, good and saintly look? But something of it remains in the new slogan launched by Mao Tse-tung, "federated government", which exposes his postwar plans: abolition of the government monopolized by the KMT and representation by all parties -- liberty of speech, association, publication, thought, and loyalty, -- peaceful and democratic union of all citizens to cease civil war -- continuation of a liberal policy towards landowners to discover gradually a means for giving to each peasant land sufficient for his livelihood; -- liberty to private capital to develop and to aid in the industrialization of the country, but State supervision of all large enterprises, with protection of the working masses (work-day of eight to ten hours, social insurance, right to form unions) and admission even of foreign capital; -- development of popular education and preparing of technical persons of all sorts (science, literature, education, medicine, arts); -- approval of the Atlantic Charter and of the decisions taken at the international conferences in Moscow, Cairo, Teheran, Yalta. In brief, the ideal has not changed a bit. It is the policy of opportunism, so combatted of late by the same Mao Tse-tung; for it matters above all else for the success of the propaganda that the Communist Party repudiate at least in words his political utterances.

The same American journalist whom we have quoted several times, finally put the following question in the course of his interview with Mao Tse-tung: "Do you mean to say that the Chinese Communist Party desires to support a democratic government after this war and does not seek to renew its struggle against the landlords?" Mao nodded his head. "Now then, I ask, do you hope to issue in Communism? How build a socialist republic?" Mao expressed his hope of seeing the change from the democratic to the socialist stage accomplished by evolution, not revolution; the principal means would be education and not violent action. "But there is no historical precedent for a peaceful introduction of socialism", I protested. Mao smiled and added: "Our endeavor is to make history, not to imitate it". (31)

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The facts belie these words. Communists are specialists in camouflage. Is not the first point in Marxist morality that all which serves the triumph of their cause is essentially good? Retreat on principles is never more than a temporary expedient; the supreme goal remains unchanged. Translator's note: The remaining two pages of the original document are a forecast of conditions likely to obtain after 22 September 1946, the document date. This forecast has been discredited by events, and adds nothing to the value of the preceding material. Hence it is omitted.

INDEXB

Boredin -- 2,3,4

C

Chang Pa-k'uei -- 4

Chang Hsueh-liang -- 9,11

Chang Kuo-t'ao -- 6,10

Ch'ao Chi-t'ang -- 11

Ch'ao Shao-yu (Wang Ming) -- 9

Ch'ao Tu-hsiu -- 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,10

Ch'ao Yen-nien -- 2

Chen Yi -- 14

Chiang Kai-shek -- 2,3,8,9,11, 12

Ch'iao-nien -- 2

Ch'iu Ch'iu-pei -- 9

Chou En-lai -- 2,3

Ch'u Ch'iu-pei -- 2,6

Chu Teh -- 2,4,6,7,9,10,12

F

Feng Yu-hsiang -- 6

H

Hanson, Haldore -- 14

Ho Lung -- 4,6,9

Ho Ying-Ch'iu -- 4

Hsiang Chung -- fa -- 4,8,9

Hsiang Ying -- 12,14

Hsiao K'o -- 9

Hsu Kai-tung 1,6,10

Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien -- 6,9,10

Hu Shih -- 1

J

Joffe -- 2

K

Karakhan -- 2

L

Lenin -- 2,5,7

Li Li-san -- 2,4,5,6,7,

Li Ta-chao -- 1,2

Li Tsung-chen -- 11

Liao Ch'ung-kai -- 2

Lin Piao -- 9

Liu Hsiang -- 9

Liu Li-tao -- 6

Liu Tzu-tan -- 10

MMao Tse-tung -- 2,3,6,7,8,9,10,11,12
13,14P

Pai Chung-hsi -- 11

P'eng Te-huai -- 12

R

Roy -- 4

S

Snow, Edgar -- 12

Stalin -- 2,4,5,7

T

Tai Chi-t'ao -- 1

T'ao P'ing-shan -- 1,2,5

T'ang Loang-li -- 5

Trotzkyite -- 5,7

Ts'ai T'ing-ch'ieh -- 9,10

V

Voitinsky -- 1

W

Wang Ching-wei -- 3

Wang Ming -- 11
(Ch'ao Shao-yu) -- 9**RESTRICTED**

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

-16-

25X1A

Y

Yang Hu-sh'ong -- 11

Yeh T'ing -- 4, 12, 14

Yen Hsi-shan -- 6

Yen-nien (Ch'en Yen-nien) -- 2

FOOTNOTES

- (1) Ch'en Tu-hsiu, first head of the CCP, born in 1879 at An-ch'ing in Anhwei, student in Japan and France, founded and directed the "New Youth" magazine, so influential in its own time (1915-1921); then he threw himself into Communism. Expelled from the party by an opposition clique, he was imprisoned by the Nanking government; pardoned in 1937, he was readmitted into the KMT, but died in 1942.
- (2) Li Ta-chao, colleague of Ch'en Tu-hsiu at Peiping University, worked with his friend from the beginning but unfortunately was arrested and shot by Chang Tso-lin about 1926.
- (3) Tai Chi-t'ao, an important personality in the KMT; born in Szechwan, studied in Japan, joined Sun Yat-sen very early, banished by the Manchu Government, took up journalism; attracted for a while by the Communists, he later left them, and held high posts (President of the Examination Yuan, Minister, University officer).
- (4) "Comintern" denotes the Communist Internationale or the Third Internationale.
- (5) T'an P'ing-shan, born in Kwangtung in 1887, was one of the first Communist leaders, but was expelled from his party in 1927; he founded the "Third Party" formed of persons expelled from the Communist party and from the KMT; but he left it and re-entered the KMT about 1927.
- (6) Chou En-lai, born at Huai-an in Kiangsu, in 1898, studied in Japan and France, and in the latter country organized a section of the CCP; returning to China in 1924, he served under Sun Yat-sen, and was secretary of the Whampoa Military Academy which Chiang Kai-shek directed; arrested as a Communist after Chiang's coup, he escaped. He organized the Canton Commune, hid himself, rejoined the Communist base in Kiangsi. He finally became vice-president of the Chinese Soviet government, and general Communist delegate to discuss matters with the Nanking government.
- (7) Mao Tse-tung, President of the Chinese Communist government since 1931, was born in Hunan in 1893, studied in his native province, later in Peiping. He was one of the founders of the Communist party (1921). He never was in France, though this has been stated several times.
- (8) Chang Fa-k'uei, born in Kwangtung in 1891, head of the formidable army called "Ironsides" during the southern expedition against the north (1926); but part of his troops went over to Communism in 1927; he quelled the Communist uprising of Canton, and commanded the region of Pootung, near Shanghai, in 1937.
- (9) Ho Lung, one of the most famous Communist generals, a native of Hunan (1897), like Mao Tse-tung; at first an officer under Chang Fa-k'uei, he later entered the Communist party a little before the Nan-ch'ang uprising in 1927; coming from a poor peasant family, his education was quite limited; he commanded the Communist troops which attacked Ta-tung, in the north of Shansi.

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- (10) Yeh T'ing, another famous Communist general from the army of Chang Fa-k'uei, who revolted with Ho Lung; he had never officially joined the Communists, but this story is only fiction. He was killed in June 1946 in an airplane crash when flying from Chungking to Yenan.
- (11) Li Li-san, born in Hunan, studied in France, where he helped found a branch of the CCP among Chinese students; coming back to Shanghai, he shuttled between Shanghai and Hankow, dominating the party from 1929 to 1931. Once overthrown, he was recalled to Russia to continue his "studies"; his stay was destined to last a long time; he reappeared on the scene a month or two ago, in Manchuria.
- (12) Chu Teh, the most famous Communist general, closely associated with Mao Tse-tung; born in 1886 in Szechwan, studied at the Yunnan Military Academy, joined the army, quickly distinguished himself, rose to high rank led quite a dissolute life as an opium-smoker; then suddenly in 1922 joined the KMT with a revolutionary purpose, quit the drug and went abroad. He studied military science in Germany; where he joined the Communist party; he stayed a while in Paris and in Moscow, returning to China in 1926, just in time to take part in the Northern Expedition. He revolted against the KMT in 1927; after various campaigns, he united his forces with those of Mao Tse-tung at Ching-kan-shan (Kiangsi-Hunan border). From that time on their destinies blended; he is commander-in-chief of the Red army.
- (13) Hsu Hai-tung, born in 1900, near Hankow, of an humble potter's family; in his childhood he had frequent quarrels with more fortunate young comrades, which prepared him to become a perfect Communist. At first a potter, he abruptly left home because of a quarrel and joined the army of Chang Fa-k'uei, where he became a Communist; he took part in the Northern Expedition of 1927. Then he began to gather his former comrades, potters, and peasants, who became the nucleus of a Communist army; he organized the base of O-yü-wan (coined from the alternate names of Hupeh, Honan, and Anhwei). In 1934, forced to leave Honan, he established a new base in the south of Shensi and made junction with the troops of Liu Tzu-tan.
- (14) Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, graduate from the Whampoa Military Academy--which Chiang Kai-shek directed when he began his expedition against the North--and was a former officer in the KMT army. He directed the organization of the O-yü-wan base; then forced to retire before the KMT army, he formed another domain in Szechwan and threw in his lot with that of Chang Kuo-t'ao against the other Communist chiefs; that nearly brought on a schism.
- (15) Chang Kuo-t'ao, a returned student from Moscow and one of the first chiefs of the Communist party, friend of Ch'en Tu-hsiu. He was the president of the O-yü-wan government, with Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien as his right-hand man. Pushed back by the central government, he went with his friend to set up a new Sovietized zone in east Szechwan, in 1934, which proved very useful to the Communist armies in their retreat towards Shensi; but not wishing to abandon his Szechwan base, he fell into conflict with the majority led by Mao Tse-tung; when he yielded and arrived in Shensi, he was imprisoned by Mao Tse-tung despite his title of vice-president of the Soviet government. Provoked, he fled and left the Communist party. His memory is execrated among the Reds.
- (16) Ch'en Shao-yu, alias Wang Ming, a returned student from Russia and almost immediately named secretary general of the Communist Party in place of Hsiang Tsung-fa in 1931, was quickly ousted by the all-powerful faction of "indigenous Communists"; partly because he was too young and excited jealousy, partly because he belonged to the "Russian clique", that is to say, students returned from Russia. He remained the chief doctrinal authority on policy and messenger from Russia.
- (17) Ts'ai T'ing-ch'ieh (Tsai Ting-kai) born in 1890 in Kwangtung, joined the army when very young; celebrated for his courage; rose from the rank of a plain soldier to the grade of general, commander-in-chief of the 19th Army. He distinguished himself by his heroic defense of Shanghai against the Japanese in 1932; then named pacification commissioner in Fukien with the 19th Army, against the Reds. Rebelled against the government, 1933-34. Since then has lived abroad.

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- (15) Hsiao K'o, a former KMT officer who mutinied in 1928, helped in the establishing of the first Communist base in China and of the first Red army; a famous expert in guerrilla warfare, he came to raise the siege of Tatung.
- (16) Lin Piao, graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, reputed to be one of the most skilful Red tacticians; born in 1908 in Hupeh; son of a ruined industrialist, he managed to get a good education and entered the Whampoa Military Academy, under Chiang Kai-shek and the Russian general Blucher, adviser to Sun Yat-sen; he joined the expedition against the northerners in the army of Chang Pa-k'uei in 1926; he was with Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing in 1927; in 1932, he was made commander of the first corps of the Red army, 20,000 strong, who were never to be defeated thanks to his extraordinary talent as a tactician; his articles on military questions have been translated or commented on in Soviet Russia, Japan, and even in KMT circles; this is why he was named President of the Red Military Academy. Now he commands the Soviet zone of Manchuria.
- (17) Liu Tzu-tan, another cadet of the Whampoa Military Academy, who laid the first foundations of the Communist state of Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia; native of north Shensi, he became a Communist and a young officer of the KMT on leaving the Whampoa Academy in 1926; took part in the northern expedition, left the national armies when Chiang Kai-shek announced a purge of the KMT party and army, and returned to his native province in 1928 to begin guerilla warfare. From 1929 to 1932 he met successes and reverses, and finished by establishing a Sovietized base at An-ting (Shensi) and thereabouts in 1933; he made junction with the troops of Hsu Hai-tung fleeing from Honan in 1934; in 1935, the entire Red army of Kiangsi arrived in north Shensi. He had the reputation of being very sanguinary.
- (21) Tsung-jen, born in Kwangsi in 1890, commanded a southern army in 1926-27, took Kiukiang, stopped the northerners from retaking Nanking by the battle of Lung-t'an, Kiangsu; named to the highest military posts in 1928, but deprived of all honors in 1929 for having fomented the defection of the Kwangsi generals; pardoned in 1931, he was promoted to be commander of the Kwangsi forces in 1932; intrigued anew against the Nanking government in 1936; commanded the Anhwei-Kiangsu-Shantung zone of operations in 1937-38. One of the most important military chieftains.
- (22) Pai Chung-hsi, a Moslem, born in Kwangsi in 1893, called the brains of the Kwangsi generals; after having received many important military posts in 1927 and 1928, he fell from favor in 1929 for having supported the defection of Li Tsung-jen; pardoned in 1931; intrigued anew against the Nanking government in 1936; but during the war he was the most famous military chieftain against the Japanese; he was the actual minister of national defense and many thought of him as the virtual successor of Chiang Kai-shek, in case of need.
- (23) Ch'en Chi-t'ang, born in Kwangtung in 1890; took part in the northern expedition in 1927 as the head of an army; from April 1931 to July 1936, he was the dominant military personage in the south of China, as military governor of Kwangtung; but his insubordination against the Nanking government in 1936, as an ally of the Kwangsi generals, caused him to be relieved of all commands and to be sent abroad "to study"; he returned during the war, but does not seem to have been put back into posts of first importance.
- (24) Chang Hsueh-liang, son of the celebrated governor of Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin, born in Manchuria (Liaoning) in 1898, succeeded his father as pacification commander of Manchuria in 1928; honored with all the highest military titles and posts; visited Europe in 1933; member of the Superior War Council, of the KMT Central Committee in 1932; named commander-in-chief for the suppression of Communist forces in the northeast in 1934; like Ts'ai T'ing-ch'ieh judging himself to be relegated to a rear position and more or less under suspicion, he revolted against Chiang Kai-shek, whom he made prisoner for 14 days, in the "Siam Incident" (December 1936). Since then he has lived deprived of all activity.
- (25) P'eng Te-huai, famous Red warrior, who appeared in 1932 as chief of the First Red Army; born in Hunan of a peasant family in good circumstances; not being able to get on with his step-mother, he left home at the age of nine and tried various ways of making a living; at 16 he joined the army, becoming a spy in the service of Sun Yat-sen; captured at Changsha, he was tortured every day for a month; once liberated, he took a course at the Hunan Military Academy; in 1926 he read various Communist classics, and put his faith in them; in 1927 he was a member of the Communist Party; in 1928 he rebelled against the KMT troops; for a long time he has been second to Chu Teh as head of the Eighth Route Army.

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- (26) "pa-lu" country means territory administered by the Communist "Eighth Route Army"; in our usage, "pa-lu" stands for "Communist soldiery".
- (27) Extracts from a small communist brochure, only mimeographed, entitled "The New Democracy".
- (28) "The Fight for a New China" by Mao Tse-tung, page 59. This brochure is the translation into English of a report made by Mao Tse-tung to the seventh national congress of the CCP, 24 April 1945 only a few months before the end of the war with Japan.
- (29) "The Fight for a New China" pp56, 57.
- (30) "Human Endeavor", by Haldore Hanson, P 303.
- (31) "Human Endeavor", by Haldore Hanson, p 310. This work finished in January 1939 relates the interviews of an American journalist in unoccupied China during the war, chiefly in Hopei and Shansi.

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